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Technology regulation has long been an area of governance where the problematic 
nature of officially sanctioned knowledge regularly spills over into wider political and 
public settings. From clashes over atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950s to more 
recent disputes over the commercialisation of agricultural genetic engineering, vir-
tually all technology- related controversies of the last 70 years have pivoted around 
conflicts over the knowledge claims that regulatory institutions invoke to inform 
and justify policy decisions. Critics have long argued that officially sanctioned 
knowledge claims reflect a particular, usually very narrow, framing of what are gen-
erally profoundly ambiguous issues (Wynne 1975), and frequently provide a false 
precision in regard to what are often arbitrary and highly uncertain judgements and 
assessments (National Research Council 1983). They have also stressed that the pre-
cise ways in which these forms of knowledge ‘closure’ occur are invariably shaped 
by the political commitments and policy preferences of incumbent state and indus-
trial actors, whether intentionally or inadvertently (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). Any 
form of closure will, in turn, delimit the kinds of policy and technological options 
that decision- makers even contemplate, and prefigure the choices made about those 
options that are subject to consideration (Felt et al. 2007). As a consequence, regu-
latory decisions are often strongly influenced, even determined, by the political 
values and policy preferences of states and regulated industries, but those values and 
preferences are disguised in apparently logical and rational language (Stirling 2008a; 
Mayer and Stirling 2004; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).
The evident tensions have been exacerbated by a long- standing historical ten-
dency on the part of scientific and policy institutions everywhere to insist that 
there are, in fact, no political or normative dimensions to the knowledge claims 
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technology regulation as concerned only with addressing the safety of individual 
technologies, as if this were logically the only legitimate grounds for social concern 
about technology, and secondly by treating issues of safety as if they were fully 
comprehendible and predictable ex ante as a problem of calculable risk, or at least as 
a resolvable technical uncertainty.
In this portrayal, technological change is assumed to reflect the inevitable 
unfolding of scientific progress, rather than human choice, while the business of 
understanding potential harm is a rational scientific problem that can be solved in 
an impartial and objective way. Technology policy therefore becomes a technocratic 
exercise of calculating risks to human and environmental health and diminishing 
them to a socially acceptable level, in order to ‘optimise’ singular, apparently inevit-
able pathways of technological change.
It is not difficult to see why this depiction is expedient, at least for some actors, but 
it is wishful thinking. The world has experienced a long series of major unexpected 
problems with technologies, from the huge human toll from the use of asbestos, to 
the effects of chlorofluorocarbons on ozone depletion, to major industrial accidents 
such as at Chernobyl and Fukushima. These have shown how very serious harm 
often comes as a complete surprise, or despite very low official estimations of the 
chances of it occurring or at a magnitude far greater than predicted (Pfotenhauer 
et al. 2012; Harremoës et al. 2001). Furthermore, the utter failures, at least in some 
jurisdictions, to secure legitimacy for politically contentious technologies such 
as civil nuclear power and agricultural genetic engineering have torpedoed the 
implicit assumption that safety is the only meaningful public issue at stake in rela-
tion to the ways in which our technological futures unfold (Wynne 1983).
Policy institutions and jurisdictions have responded very slowly and unevenly, if 
at all, to these kinds of problems, and to an important critique of orthodox regu-
lation, led by both the environmental and public health movements and by natural 
and social scientists (e.g. Stirling 2008b; Global Environmental Change Programme 
1999; Santillo et al. 1998; Wynne 1982). Even where events and acute crises have 
made it overwhelmingly clear that at least some aspects of claims to science- based 
objectivity in regulatory decision- making are highly normative, the traditional 
depiction of regulation as a singularly rational technocratic endeavour has proved 
remarkably resilient in many institutions.
In this chapter I reflect on this conundrum through a brief discussion of two 
areas of contemporary European technology regulation, which I  suggest have 
wider resonance: the cultivation of transgenic plant varieties and efforts to reform 
pesticide regulation. Both cases illustrate how unfolding events, campaigning and 
contextual issues and processes can sometimes force a partial ‘opening up’ of other-
wise routine or opaque processes of knowledge closure, potentially heralding a 
broadening of technology regulation, for example so that policy addresses a wider 
set of potential vulnerabilities, or compares the pros and cons of different techno-
logical practices. Yet both cases also show how a more intellectually honest appre-
ciation of, and response to, the uncertain, contested and provisional nature of much 
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industries they regulate, and how many regulatory agencies and industry bodies 
have responded, and are responding, to such ‘opening up’ dynamics by trying 
aggressively to reassert an orthodox technocratic depiction of regulation, and in 
doing so shut down the rationale for more ambitious regulatory experimentation.
The more general phenomenon here is that political contexts and processes 
mediate a dynamic, perhaps dialectic, tension in much contemporary technology 
regulation – between the long- standing tradition of framing technology regula-
tion around a control- based vision of risk management, supported by government- 
industry knowledge claims, and countervailing pressures to challenge the power 
embodied in such reductionist framings and to broaden out questions about 
technological vulnerability, and ultimately technological choice, for wider deliber-
ation and collective decision- making. How such tensions play out in any specific 
area of regulation and whether a more emancipatory knowledge politics – and in 
turn transformative technology policy – can be fostered remain open questions. 
I argue that the emerging sustainability transformation agenda holds considerable 
potential to help foster such a shift, given that it invites a framing of the ways we 
think about technological vulnerabilities, and about socio- technical futures, that is 
fundamentally incompatible with orthodox regulatory approaches.
Transgenic crop regulation and the intractability of 
‘incertitude’
More than two decades of protracted conflict and regulatory paralysis in Europe in 
regard to the cultivation of genetically engineered (GE) crops illustrate very well 
how different dimensions of what Stirling (2008b) calls ‘incertitude’ – an unpacking 
of the broad, colloquial notion of ‘uncertainty’ (see Box 4.1) – affect and sometimes 
complicate knowledge production and regulatory decision- making.
In the early 1990s, the brand new European transgenic crop regulatory regime 
was typical of most areas of technology regulation:  its remit was to anticipate 
and avoid ‘adverse effects’ on human health and the environment from indi-
vidual technological artefacts, in this case transgenic crop varieties. The need 
for, and the potential benefits of, the new technology did not form part of the 
assessment, but were effectively assumed. Assessment focused, at least initially, on 
anticipating relatively direct forms of (practically measurable or estimable proxies 
for) potential harm, which were then evaluated against the benchmark of damage 
already caused by prevailing technological practice, in this case intensive agricul-
ture. Scientific and regulatory conclusions about the potential ‘risks’ posed by the 
new crop technology were reported as if they were derived from an objective 
assessment of the scientific facts, with little if any acknowledgement of uncer-
tainties, subjective assumptions or limits to what scientists could practically antici-
pate. This way of analytically defining, conducting and representing technology 
regulation was not inevitable, but rather followed the practice that had been 
established almost everywhere in the post- war period (Stirling 2010; Millstone 
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BOX 4.1 DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF INCERTITUDE
Risk – possible outcomes and their likelihoods can be reliably estimated
Uncertainty – possible outcomes are clear, but there is no basis for assigning 
probabilities
Ignorance – neither outcomes nor their probabilities can be fully characterised
Ambiguity  – probabilities can in principle be characterised, but there is no 
agreement over how to define the possible outcomes  – for example, in 
terms of what the problem is, how the object of regulatory attention is 
bounded and which questions to address
Source: Stirling (2008b)
Right from the outset the new European regime ran into difficulties. The 
European single market meant that regulations had to be consistent across member 
states, so the new regime was based on the expectation that authorisation of a new 
transgenic crop in one member state would apply across Europe. In practice, unan-
imity proved impossible to obtain.
In the early 1990s, several biotechnology firms applied to release novel GE var-
ieties. Regulators in the countries where the applications had been made accepted 
the firms’ claims, based on field trial data, that adverse effects were unlikely. However, 
several other countries immediately dissented, claiming that a broader range of 
plausible potential adverse effects should have been taken into consideration. For 
example, Denmark and Austria objected to the approval in the UK of herbicide- 
tolerant canola (also known as oil seed rape) on the grounds that commercial culti-
vation of that variety might result in an increase in overall herbicide usage and, via 
hybridisation with wild relatives, might create herbicide- tolerant weeds, requiring 
additional herbicides to be used. These effects had been acknowledged as possible 
during the initial approval process in the UK but had been discounted, not on the 
grounds that they were unlikely but because any increase in herbicide usage would 
be a result of crop management practices, and not a direct harmful effect of the trans-
genic variety itself, and because the emergence of herbicide- tolerant weeds would 
be an ‘agricultural problem’ rather than a cause of ‘environmental harm’ (Levidow 
2001). This was not a disagreement about how evidence should be interpreted but 
rather reflected ambiguities regarding how ‘harm’ should be defined and what pre-
cisely the potential ‘problem’ was that regulation ought to be addressing, and there-
fore what issues should properly fall within the boundary of any assessment. The 
reasons why the objectors dissented had to do with their own particular agricultural 
priorities and contexts. Denmark, for example, was trying to reduce agrochemical 
contamination of groundwater, which it relied on for drinking water.
The European Commission overruled these kinds of objections and approved 
the new transgenic varieties. Yet the refusal to recognise the validity of these 




62 Patrick van Zwanenberg
assessment, eventually provoked several countries unilaterally to ban crop varieties 
that had already secured Europe- wide approval. As the decade wore on and GE 
crops and food became increasingly contentious, a range of broader concerns about 
the ‘problem’ posed by transgenic crops began to find expression in public debates. 
For example, the Italian parliament emphasised the risks of dependence on multi-
national firms and the threat to traditional crop varieties (Levidow 2009). But these 
were not issues that regulators were permitted to consider.
The more familiar issue of technical uncertainty was also utterly pervasive. 
Consider, for example, the potential problem described above of the hybridisation 
of transgenic canola with wild relatives, creating herbicide- tolerant weeds. Although 
we know that transfer of canola genes to weedy relatives can occur, measurements 
of pollen flow at 100 metres from transgenic canola have varied across different data 
sets by nine orders of magnitude (Meyer et al. 2005). Estimates of the frequency 
of gene transfer will also depend heavily on contingent management practice, and 
the development of resistant weeds by selection will also depend on herbicide use 
practices by farmers, which are also highly variable. As Meyer and colleagues put 
it:  ‘obvious problematic effects … can be identified. To what extent they should 
be regarded as harmful to the environment is a matter of interpretation. Credible 
probability calculations cannot be made’ (Meyer et al. 2005: 237).
In such circumstances, subjective judgements have to be invoked if the 
conclusions of assessments are not to remain chronically open- ended. For example, 
what kinds and qualities of evidence are sufficient to conclude that herbicide- tolerant 
weeds will emerge as, say, a serious environmental problem? Regulatory institutions’ 
responses to such uncertainties were contentious, but not only because the neces-
sarily subjective judgements deployed were invariably represented as flowing from 
the scientific ‘facts’.
In addition, several critics argued that such judgements were deployed inconsist-
ently, with evidence suggestive of harm assumed to be ‘insufficient’ far more readily 
than evidence indicative of the absence of harm (Hilbeck et al. 2012; Levidow 2001). 
In the late 1990s, for instance, a laboratory study on the ecological effects of transgenic 
insecticidal maize reported significant mortality among lacewing butterfly larvae 
(a beneficial predator insect often found in maize fields) that had been fed on another 
species of caterpillar that was first raised on GE maize leaves. UK advisers did not 
challenge these experimental findings but argued that the laboratory study was not a 
realistic representation of the field situation – for example, because the larvae would 
have had a more varied diet in real- world conditions, and would therefore have 
been exposed to less GE maize (Wynne 2006). Critics pointed out that ‘although 
such hypotheses were not unreasonable’ they were almost exclusively made about 
studies that indicated potential harm: laboratory- based observations that suggested 
there was no harm from new transgenic plant varieties were routinely taken to be an 
adequate representation of real field situations (Wynne 2006; Levidow 2001).
Ignorance about the consequences of cultivating GE crops was an even more 
formidable problem, but it was barely recognised as such, and its implications were 
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is interesting to observe how scientists and regulators sometimes diminished earlier 
states of ‘institutional ignorance’, in the sense that categories of adverse effect or 
causal pathways of harm that were not initially recognised by regulators (and so were 
not made the subject of questioning) were later discovered. The above example of 
the lacewing butterfly larvae study illustrates this point. Early regulatory- scientific 
studies of the possible effects of insecticidal GE maize on ‘non- target harm’ were 
based on investigating the direct effects of the insecticidal toxin expressed in GE 
maize varieties on beneficial insects (Levidow 2003). Those tests had found no add-
itional harm from the GE maize. However, experimental tests were later performed 
by a university on carnivorous insects (i.e., the lacewing larvae study) further along 
the food chain in what is called a tri- trophic test (i.e., involving the plant, a pest and 
a predator). This more indirect causal pathway did indicate harm, in ways that had 
not been previously recognised or considered.
This example of institutional ignorance is entirely normal. Anticipatory regu-
latory knowledge about the consequences of commercially growing GE plants, 
based on small numbers of field trials and laboratory studies, has no chance of 
adequately capturing the complexity, contingency and variety of the conditions 
of actual commercial use. In part this is because of a host of practical constraints 
on what can be practically explored, but it is also because of normal scientific and 
regulatory commitments to particular kinds of theoretical models, testing methods 
and assumptions (Wynne 1992). Such commitments are sometimes questioned and 
enlarged, as part of a normal healthy process of scientific learning, as in the above 
 example – although it is telling that in that case the prevailing experimental design 
was only re- examined by a non- regulatory- scientific institution in a context of 
intense public concern about the new crop technology.
A window of opportunity?
Intra- European disputes over the licensing of GE crops, particularly in relation to 
competing understandings as to what precisely the potential ‘problem’ was with the 
new crop technology, and therefore what kinds of questions ought to be explored, 
but also over what should count as adequate or sufficient evidence of safety, posed a 
serious challenge to the prospects of arriving at common regulatory decisions. One 
response would have been to recognise the challenges of incertitude, which were 
increasingly obvious, and which social scientists, NGOs and some protagonists had 
helped highlight. Taking those challenges seriously would have entailed making 
explicit and justifying  – and if necessary renegotiating  – the inevitable norma-
tive assumptions that are part and parcel of regulatory- scientific assessment. This 
would have entailed, for example, debating what burdens of proof were appro-
priate in particular situations of technical uncertainty, or what the relevant scientific 
questions to ask should be, given ambiguity over the potential problems posed by 
GE crop technology. Taking ignorance seriously might have involved adopting a 
less hubristic representation of what anticipatory assessment can achieve, and might 
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Initially, it appeared that something approaching these kinds of responses might 
be forthcoming. By the late 1990s, concerns about the safety and acceptability of 
GE crops had exploded as a public issue across Europe. Environment ministers from 
several member states refused to support any more applications for new crop var-
ieties until substantial revisions to the legislation were made. Ministers demanded 
that a wider range of potential risks be considered in applications – in particular, 
indirect effects that arise from the changed agricultural practices associated with 
a GE crop. They also wanted an obligation to monitor crops after approval, the 
rationale being to check for any adverse consequences that had not been discovered 
in experimental field trials, and for food and animal feed produced using GE plants 
to be traceable throughout the product chain, in order to ensure that food could be 
withdrawn if new evidence emerged regarding unknown health hazards (Levidow 
et al. 2005). Interestingly, these latter proposed revisions showed a recognition of 
ignorance about the potential consequences of agricultural biotechnology com-
mercialisation, and an institutional attempt to try to diminish our vulnerability to 
such ‘unknown- unknowns’ (Wynne 1992).
New legislation incorporating all of these demands came into force in 2001. 
This occurred in the wake of the BSE or ‘mad cow’ crisis of 1996, shortly after 
which it became clear that profound uncertainty about whether the cattle dis-
ease might be transmitted to humans had been entirely glossed over by ministers 
and officials, in both the UK and within the European Commission. In the 
wake of the BSE crisis many regulatory institutions began to emphasise how 
important it was from now on that the institutions responsible for the assessment 
of scientific evidence should be ‘independent’ and that scientists should ensure 
that levels of uncertainty should be explicitly identified and communicated in 
plain language to decision- makers, and that any assumptions should be expli-
citly documented (OST 2005). A key driver of these reforms was the actions of 
government chief scientists, who had been alarmed not only by the potential 
catastrophe of BSE but also by the way in which ‘science’ had been used as pol-
itical cover for ministers and officials throughout the saga (van Zwanenberg and 
Millstone 2005).
Reasserting orthodoxy at the European Commission
In practice, however, a more intellectually honest treatment of incertitude was 
not forthcoming. Instead, the Commission and its advisers attempted to reassert a 
modified version of the orthodox, technocratic depiction of regulation, although – 
in a partial concession – regulation was now split into two distinctive parts: ‘risk 
assessment’, which was represented as a policy- free, objective scientific endeavour, 
and ‘risk management’, which involved some normative decisions (Millstone 2009). 
Levidow (2017) notes how many senior people at the Commission had diagnosed 
the conflicts over GE crop assessment and decision- making over the previous 
decade as arising from national politics interfering with the proper scientific basis of 
risk regulation. New legislation introduced a centralised procedure of authorisation 
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European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) would now play a more central role in sci-
entific assessment of GE crops, while risk management would be the responsibility 
of the European Commission. As Directorate- General for Health and Consumers 
Commissioner David Byrne put it in 2002:
[EFSA’s] independence will ensure that scientific risk assessment work is not 
swayed by policy or other external considerations. … [The development of 
EFSA’s reputation for independence and excellence] will put an end to com-
petition in such matters among national authorities in the Member States. We 
have seen evidence of this in the past and I hope that it will over time become 
a thing of the past (Byrne 2002: 3– 4).
However, the new role for EFSA only exacerbated intra- European disputes. After 
several new transgenic crop varieties were approved by the Commission in the 
2000s, Germany, France, Austria and Italy declared national prohibitions on their 
cultivation, which they were permitted to do under a ‘safeguard clause’ if new 
scientific information demonstrated a risk to human health or the environment. 
EFSA concluded that all the prohibitions lacked sufficient scientific evidentiary 
support and the Commission ruled that the bans were illegal – although none of 
the member states concerned backed down.
The unilateral bans had been made for the same kinds of reasons that had under-
pinned disputes in the previous decade: disagreements over which effects should 
count as ‘adverse’, and over what should count as meaningful or adequate or rele-
vant evidence for a risk assessment (Levidow 2017; Wickson and Wynne 2012). 
EFSA’s role was thus critical in facilitating the continuing impasse. For the Agency 
there was only one relevant framing of the scientific- regulatory problem and only 
one plausible interpretation of the evidence, namely its own. Its own scientific 
guidelines required Agency staff to make all assumptions explicit (EFSA 2009), but 
in practice it had ignored normative judgements within science, or represented 
them as scientific considerations (Levidow 2017).
For some analysts, the Commission and EFSA’s ‘normative- free’ sound science 
representation of transgenic crop assessment reflects an entrenched institutional 
commitment to the European single market, which in turn requires a single regula-
tory system and therefore a centralised, standardised risk assessment (Wynne 2006). 
For others it is more an attempt by the Commission and EFSA to disguise a pro- 
biotech agenda – the Commission sees biotech as essential for future growth and 
competitiveness – under the guise of unitary science (Levidow 2015; Dolezel et al. 
2011). Yet others point to naive beliefs in the political neutrality and universality 
of regulatory science on the part of some scientists and officials, and in particular 
in the scientistic assumption that science ought to define the human meaning of 
issues such as GE crop innovation. In this reading, any concerns other than those 
identified by officially sanctioned scientific institutions must be illegitimate ‘hidden 
interests’ and ‘anti- scientific’, especially if they are not exclusively about public 
or environment health but extend to cover public concerns about the political- 
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Additional explanations are not necessarily incompatible with any of the above. 
For example, Commission officials may have concluded that it was too politically risky 
to acknowledge openly the contingent and highly uncertain nature of regulatory- 
scientific knowledge because it could then become very difficult to draw a line and 
prevent further, endless deconstruction of whatever claims were officially sanctioned. 
The political risk here is not just that institutions are unable to pretend that conten-
tious policy decisions can be justified solely by recourse to evidence, but that events 
may quickly spiral out of control. An explicit acknowledgement that we cannot pre-
dict future impacts might lead logically to demands for expensive or burdensome 
controls, or to politically problematic questions being posed, such as ‘why then are 
we supporting this technology?’, ‘what and whose needs is it designed to satisfy?’ and 
‘what are the alternatives?’ It is far easier politically, perhaps, to insist that knowledge 
claims are universal and complete. British officials often made this kind of political 
calculation during the BSE saga, for instance (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005).
Pesticide regulation and the sustainability 
transformation agenda
In attempting to impose a singular meaning of ‘risk’, and a single analytical 
treatment of it, on multiple European countries with diverse sets of concerns and 
agricultural priorities, European GE crop regulation has scuppered any prospect 
of common regulatory decisions. By contrast, in the field of pesticide regulation 
standard approaches to risk regulation have been stretched to accommodate a much 
wider analytical framing. A significant factor influencing this is the emerging sus-
tainability transformation agenda, which has challenged some long- held ortho-
doxies in pesticide regulation.
In 2011, two new pieces of European legislation on pesticide approval and pesti-
cide use came into force (EC 2009a; 2009b). The new legislation contained four 
novel regulatory measures that drive a coach and horses through the traditional 
analytical treatment of pesticide regulation. These are to:
• use hazard- based cut- off criteria to prohibit all pesticides that exhibit the intrinsic 
potential of serious toxicity or persistence;
• use comparative hazard assessment to substitute authorised chemical pesticide uses 
for the least hazardous alternatives, including non- chemical techniques;
• promote non- chemical pest management, specifically organic farming and
• establish integrated pest management in all agricultural practice (in which bio-
logical, agronomic and physical forms of insect, weed and fungal control are 
given priority over chemical control).
The new measures represent a profound challenge to the central regulatory tenet 
that anticipatory risk assessment provides a sufficiently reliable and complete basis 
upon which to anticipate and control potential harm from the commercial use of a 
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which means that the intrinsic toxic potential or persistence of a compound 
becomes grounds for prohibition. The traditional risk- based approach would also 
involve estimating the likely exposure to the compound under different conditions 
of use and to different populations; it would model and estimate dose- response 
relationships based on experimental rodent studies, and then derive estimates of 
the magnitude of potential harm to humans under different use scenarios, as the 
basis upon which regulatory decisions are taken. That orthodox approach is, how-
ever, afflicted by persistent uncertainties because numerical estimates of the mag-
nitude of harm at different levels of exposure (or more typically the derivation of 
a threshold level of exposure that constitutes ‘no harm’) are usually impossible to 
derive without deploying a series of cumulative, entirely subjective assumptions 
(Bailar and Bailar 1999). They are also vulnerable to ignorance  – for example, 
because relevant exposure pathways may be entirely unknown (Wynne 1992).
The adoption of a hazard- based approach (long advocated in the literature on 
precautionary forms of appraisal, see Lofstedt 2011 and Harremoës et  al. 2001) 
does not avoid vulnerability to incertitude. Important forms of toxicity may be 
unknown and therefore remain untested. Yet it substantially diminishes such vulner-
ability, for the reasons provided above. It errs on the side of caution, on the grounds 
that we are unlikely to be able reliably to identify thresholds of safe exposure to 
compounds that are, for instance, carcinogens or endocrine disruptors, or to ensure 
that actual use of such compounds will conform to regulatory assumptions about 
working practice.
The particular formulation of the measure on comparative hazard assessment 
under these new pieces of European legislation  – in which non- chemical 
techniques of pest control must be included as a comparator  – also demolishes 
another orthodox regulatory tenet:  the traditional bounding of the ‘object’ of 
regulatory scrutiny as only involving individual technological artefacts. Yet that 
bounding is ambiguous. There is no scientific reason why, instead, the object of 
regulatory attention should not extend to multiple artefacts (and their synergies 
and interactions), or an entire technological system or technological trajectory or, 
as in the new European legislation, an artefact assessed by comparison with alterna-
tive technological or policy means of obtaining the same social goal. Indeed, since 
the greater scope of specificity of such a comparative approach would be more 
scientifically rigorous, the real reason for restricting attention in the conventional 
approach must be recognised instead as expediency, in favour of the privileged 
interests whose particular innovations receive such singular treatment.
More generally, the combination of the four new measures under the new legis-
lation – which both increase regulatory pressure to withdraw existing chemical 
technologies and support the creation of non- chemical alternatives – effectively 
defines the entire system of chemical pesticide- based crop production itself as a 
source of vulnerability, even though that system is based on approved pesticides. The 
purpose of regulation is no longer the orthodox one of ‘optimising’ supposedly self- 
unfolding pathways of chemical pesticide- based agricultural production, but rather 
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What, then, prompted this much wider analytical framing of pesticide regula-
tion? The novel assessment measures were drafted by Green Party Members of the 
European Parliament on the European Parliament’s Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety Committee, and then steered through the legislative process 
with the support of some of the smaller EU states (Bozzini 2017; Panke 2012). 
The measures were strongly informed by ideas about precautionary forms of 
technology appraisal, and specifically long- standing concerns about the failure of 
orthodox pesticide regulation to anticipate and control threats to human health 
and the environment (Bozzini 2017: 66). In 2019, the committee emphasised the 
central role of pesticides in the collapse in insect species, farmland birds and other 
biodiversity, and argued that current dependence on pesticides was ‘incompatible 
with sustainable agriculture’ (European Parliament 2019: 3). It described the new 
legislation as ‘a prerequisite for … accomplishing a transition towards sustain-
able agriculture’ (ibid.:  11). Here, then, we see a new political context, shaped 
by the rise of precautionary thinking, and by the emerging ‘sustainability trans-
formation’ agenda, and which, in response to existential environmental threats, 
seeks to reframe the traditional regulatory focus, moving from the management 
of individual technologies to fostering transformative socio- technical change 
(cf. Intergovernmental Science- Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services 2019).
A reassertion of orthodoxy?
Unsurprisingly, the new measures were heavily criticised by many governments and 
by the chemical pesticide industry, both before and after the legislation came into 
force. In 2008, for example, the UK’s Pesticide Safety Directorate objected to the 
then proposed hazard- based cut- off criteria, insisting that ‘no meaningful benefits 
to public health protection from any criteria, beyond those delivered by the existing 
risk assessment arrangements, have been demonstrated’ (cited in Bozzini 2017: 71). 
Those remarks are a defence of the fundamental orthodox regulatory assumption 
that asserted risk parameters, and their supposed means for definitive quantification, 
provide an entirely adequate basis for control – an assumption that, of course, the 
new legislative measures fatally undermine.
Tellingly, the UK government has interpreted the legislative obligation to estab-
lish integrated pest management in all agricultural practice as an issue of economic 
optimisation, rather than as a means of reducing harm, on the basis that risk- based 
regulatory approval of pesticides already adequately manages safety (Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 2012). It has therefore made minimal efforts 
to support the adoption of integrated pest management, suggesting instead that this 
should be a voluntary option for utility- maximising farmers. As with GE crop regu-
lation, explicit recognition of the challenges of incertitude, and the implications 
this logically entails for broadening the scope and ambition of regulatory decision- 
making, has prompted a reaction on the part of some jurisdictions to reassert an 
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It remains unclear how this will play out. The European Parliament has described 
how, in the eight years since the new legislation came into force, implementation 
has become bogged down in arguments about the desirability, precise meaning and 
practical implications of many of the proposed new objectives (European Parliament 
2019; 2018). The introduction of the hazard- based ‘cut- off ’ assessment of substances 
was delayed to 2014, and five years later had resulted in the prohibition of only one 
pesticide active ingredient; meanwhile several member states and the agro- chemical 
industry have been lobbying to drop the use of the hazard- based cut- off assessment 
altogether. Comparative assessment began in 2015, but so far no compounds have 
been substituted for safer alternatives. Little progress, in most member states, has 
been made on encouraging the use of alternative pest control techniques or the 
adoption of integrated pest management. Instead, there has been an increase in the 
overall volume of chemical pesticide use across the EU as a whole (ibid.).
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the contemporary politics of technology regulation 
play out through a key tension: between an established narrow framing of what is 
at stake in technology regulation, namely the optimisation of singular pathways of 
technological progress based on a control- based vision of risk management, and 
countervailing pressures to challenge those reductionist framings and open up 
questions about technological vulnerability, and ultimately technological choice, to 
wider deliberation and collective decision- making.
The experience of European regulation of transgenic plant varieties shows how 
a key moment of ‘opening up’ was associated with processes of regulatory harmon-
isation, following the creation of the European single market, and the fallout from 
the BSE crisis. In the case of pesticide regulation, new, emergent political processes 
associated with ideas about precaution and the ‘sustainability transformation’ 
agenda have challenged established approaches to assessment. Both cases illustrate 
how contestation over knowledge can unsettle established regulatory practice and 
prompt a broadening of the scope of regulation – radically so in the pesticides case. 
They also illustrate how some institutions and industry bodies have responded by 
trying to reassert an orthodox depiction of knowledge and regulation, thus under-
mining a rationale for more ambitious, potentially transformative, forms of policy.
The pesticides case suggests that the sustainability transformation agenda may be 
a particularly significant, emerging aspect of the political contexts that mediate the 
tensions described in this chapter. Propelled onto policy agendas by the twin crises of 
climate breakdown and biodiversity collapse, the significance of the transformation 
agenda is that it invites a framing of the ways we think about technological vulnerabil-
ities and of socio- technical futures that is fundamentally incompatible with orthodox 
regulatory approaches. That agenda focuses policy attention on the vulnerabilities 
posed by entire trajectories of linked socio- technical change, rather than the threats 
presented by individual artefacts; on questions about what kinds of futures we want, 
rather than the assumption that there is a single deterministic pathway of progress and 
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on questions about the multiple contending pathways involved in getting there, and 
so the importance of appreciating plural knowledge and deliberating among different 
options, rather than denial of ambiguity. Above all, it undermines the orthodox 
assumption that regulation can adequately anticipate and control the vulnerabilities 
posed by our unfolding technological futures. If that were so, why is there an urgent 
need to transform established socio- technical practice?
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